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Abstract Most combatants in armed conflict are men, so naturally men are the
major direct victims of military operations. Yet armed conflicts have important indi-
rect negative consequences on agriculture, infrastructure, public health provision, and
social order. These indirect consequences are often overlooked and underappreci-
ated. They also affect women—arguably more so than men. This article provides the
first rigorous analysis of the impact of armed conflict on female life expectancy rel-
ative to male. We lind that over the entire conflict period, interstate and civil wars oti
average affect women more adversely than men. In peacetime, wometi typically live
longer than men. Hence, armed conflict tends to decrease the gap between female
and male life expectancy. For civil wars, we also find that ethnic wars and wars in
"failed" states are much more damaging to women than other civil wars. Our find-
ings challenge policymakers as well as intemational and humanitarian organizations
to develop policies that tackle the large indirect and long-term negative health impacts
of armed conflicts.
There can be no doubt that armed conflict directly kills, injures, and harms more
men than women in that combatants are predominantly male.' Yet, armed conflict
has many negative indirect consequences on health and survival. Indeed, there are
good reasons to presume that the indirect consequences of conflict are much more
important in many cases than the direct casualties. Lacina and Gleditsch concur
that direct conflict fatalities do "not provide a remotely adequate account of the
true human costs of conflict."^ Most victims of war die in silence. We will argue
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in this article that women are likely to suffer most from the indirect consequences.
Our estimation results show that on average women are overall more negatively
affected by armed conflict than men, suggesting that the indirect consequences are
stronger than the direct effects.
The indirect effects of militarized conflicts' result from, among others, reduced
access to food, hygiene, health services, and clean water—and by lifting the thin
veil of civilization. Women suffer more severely from the damage to the health
and other infrastructure and the wider economic damage as well as from displace-
ment and dislocation during and after conflict. The breakdown of social order and
the ensuing brutalization fuels male aggression against women, who suffer from
sexual violence both within and outside their domestic household. Until recently,
no particular attention was paid to the gender-specific aspects of the negative
impacts of violent conflict. Recent reports by the United Nations (UN) General
Secretary to the Security Council, the UN Development Fund for Women, and (lie
Intemational Committee of the Red Cross have tried to spotlight the issue,'* Ours
is the tirst serious attempt at testing rigorously and directly whether armed con-
flict does indeed affect women's survival chances more severely than that of men.
Specifically, this article analyzes the impact of militarized conflict on the so-called
gender gap in life expectancy, which we define as the ratio of female to male life
expectancy at hirth (in most countries women live longer than men in peacetime
such that the ratio is above unity).^ We study whether armed confiict—intemational
and civil war—decreases this ratio. In brief, we find that on average and given the
sample that we analyze, armed conflict decreases the ratio of female to male life
expectancy at birth. Consequently, armed conflict appears to narrow rather than
widen the gender gap in life expectancy. Yet we also find that civil wars differ in
respect to their impact on the gender gap in life expectancy. Specifically, noneth-
nic civil wars have no effect on the gender gap, whereas in ethnic civil wars women
seem to he the prime victims and particularly so if the ethnic conflict lakes place
in a "failed" state. '
Despite a rise in quantitative gender-analytical studies in recent years, no one
has yet rigorously analyzed the uneven effect that armed conflict has on men and
women. Instead, existing scholarship has focused on whether gender inequality
affects the likelihood of using violence in intra- and interstate conflict.^ Similarly,
despite the fact that armed political conflict has some obvious consequences on
public health, mortality, and life expectancy, surprisingly few conflict studies have
.3. We u.se Ihe terms "'anned conllict," "militarized conflict." and "war" interchangeably.
4. See UN 2002; UNDFW 2()t)2; and ICRC 2(K)1.
5. The gender gap in life expectancy is usually measured as the absolute difference between female
and male life expectancy, rather than the raliu between the Iwo. For reasons explained below. Ihis
absolute tlitference can be a misleading indicator. We stress, however, that our result.s uphold even if
we defined the gender gap as the absolute difference.
6. See Marshall and Ram.sey 1999; Caprioli 2()00, 2003, and 2005; Caprioli and Boyer 2001; and
Regan and Paskeviciute 2003,
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tried to estimate these effects systematically and rigorously. Indeed, we know of
only four relevant studies.^ These analyses report a significant negative impact of
international and civil wars on life expectancy or disability-adjusted life years.
None of these studies directly analyzes the gender gap in life expectancy, however.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. The first section explains
how our study relates to two strands of literature in international relations, namely,
gender studies and studies on the health consequences of conflict. The second sec-
tion provides an explanation of why militarized conflicts should have an influence
on the gender gap in life expectancy. The third section discusses the research design
of our quantitative study. The fourth section presents the results; and the final sec-
tion concludes.
Link to Existing Literature
Our study relates to two important strands of literature in international relations
(IR). First, our analysis is located in an emergent strand within IR that employs
gender as an analytical category. This means that we try to explain the differential
itnpacts of armed confiict on men and women not merely by recourse to biologi-
cal differences, hut also by tracing the different vulnerabilities that derive from
the social roles men and women assume, voluntarily or involuntarily. As Moser
has argued, a gender analysis assists in understanding why men and women as
social actors and with differential access to resources are differentially affected hy
violence.^ Taking gender seriously also means that despite focusing on the harm
that anned conflicts impose on women, we must not ignore the violence and harm
suffered by men as either combatants or civilians. In certain contexts, noncombatant
men can be singled out for massacres, as happened in Rwanda and Yugoslavia, at
the same time as large-scale sexual and other abuse and violence is inflicted on
women.** Our analysis will show that women on average suffer more from the
indirect and long-term consequences of armed conflict, which calls for much greater
attention being paid to these effects. It does not, however, justify the neglect of
civilian men in humanitarian crisis evacuations, which can go contrary to the very
aim of evacuating those most vulnerable, as Carpenter has forcefully argued in the
context of evacuations in the Yugoslav conflicts.'" Such ill-informed policy deci-
sions are probably attributable to the preponderance of gender stereotypes that see
men only and exclusively as perpetrators and women only and exclusively as vic-
tims of violence." Carpenter shows that such stereotypes are often strategically
7. See Davis and Kuritsky 2002; Ghobarah, Huth, and Russett 2003 and 2004; and Li and Wen
2005.
8. Moser 2001.
9. See Jones 1994, 2000, 2002. and 2004; and Carpenter 2003.
10. Carpenter 2003.
11. Carver 2004.
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employed by humanitarian organizations to raise and mobilize support for their
operations.'-
Taking gender seriously as an analytical concept does not imply that we sub-
scribe to the feminist IR agenda of active engagement in a political struggle for
the empowerment of women.'-' Carpenter has lamented that mainstream IR schol-
ars have heen largely silent on gender, thus depriving knowledge on gender of non-
feminist insights.'•' As mainstream IR scholars, we aspire lo correct this potential
bias to some extent hy directly focusing on gender for an important aspect of IR,
namely, the consequences of the use of armed violence. Our main question can be
answered by employing traditional IR methods of formulating and testing hypoth-
eses using procedures that are publicly known and replicahle.'^ Our analysis thus
complements quantitative gender-analytical IR studies undertaken hy scholars, some
of which would regard themselves as feminists, whereas others would not."' The
main difference to these studies is that we quantitatively estimate the gender-specific
effects of armed political conflict, whereas existing studies address the impact of
gender inequality on the use of violence in interstate and intrastate conflict.'"'
Second, our analysis directly relates to studies that have addressed Ihe broader
and long-term public health consequences of armed conflict. Our t>riginal contri-
bution is that we look at these consequences with a gender-analytical perspective.
Three recent articles have demonstrated the seemingly obvious: intemational and
civil wars reduce the quality of life of broad parts of the population and reduce
the mean life expectancy of the country that is engaged in militarized conflicts.
For example, Ghobarah. Huth, and Russett study cross-national variation in 1999
data on disability-adjusted life years (DALYs)."* DALY is a new measure that has
been estitnated by the World Health Organization (WHO) starting in the late 1990s.
DALYs are calculated for individual major disease categories and reflect the years
of life lost due to death in the fatal cases as well as the expected disability caused
by a disease in nonfatal cases. They are the most important input for estimating
health adjusted life expectancy (HALE), which adjusts nominal life expectancy
for expected yciu-s with disability. Specifically, Ghobarah, Huth. and Rus.sett regress
DALYs in 1999 on estimated fatality figures from civil wars in the period 1991 to
1997 as well as a range of control variables. The results are interpreted as the
long-term effects of civil wars. They estimate that around 12 million DALYs were
lost in 1999 due to civil wars in the same countries plus perhaps another 3 million
DALYs in neighboring countries, which is close to twice WHO's estimate of direct
12. Carpenter 2(H)5.
13. As outlined, for example, by Tickner 1997, 2001, and 2005.
14. Carpenter 2(M)2, 133.
15. Keohiine 1998, 196.
16. See Caprioli 2004 for an overview.
17. See Marshall and Ramsey 1999; Caprioli 2000. 2003, and 2005; Caprioli and Boyer 2001; and
Regan and Paskeviciute 2003.
18. Ghobarah, Huth. and Russett 2003 and 2004.
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and immediate loss of DALYs from all armed conflicts in 1999.''' Looking at indi-
vidual disease categories broken down by gender and age group, Ghoharah, Huth,
and Russett find that infectious diseases and transport accidents are the categories
for which there is most consistent evidence for an effect of civil war. They also
find that past fatality figures had a statistically significant effect on more disease
categories for women than for men and for more categories for children than chunce
would predict. This is interpreted as evidence that women and children arc affected
most by the long-term con.sequences of conflict, which is problematic, however,
without detailed information on the number of fatalities in each disease category,
broken down by age and sex. Only an aggregate measure of mortality such as the
gender-specific life expectancy we use is capable of telling us whether in total
more women were killed than men or were killed at an earlier age than men by
tbe combined direct and indirect effects of war.
Davis and Kuritsky use panel data to estimate the effect of armed conflict on
life expectancy and other health indicators in sub-Saharan Africa over the period
1980 to 1997.-^ " They estimate that life expectancy in countries, which experi-
enced a conflict with at least 1,000 deaths, on average declined by about one year.
This increases to an estimated 2.35 years for severe conflicts, defined as conflicts
in the course of which at least 1 percent
A recent study by Li and Wen analyzes the effects of an armed conflict dummy
as well as of past conflict duration on adult mortality (people aged fifteen to sixty-
four).-' While their main focus is on quantifying the effects of wars on mortality
rather than on the gender differences in mortality, they find that men typically
suffer higher immediate conflict mortality, whereas men and women are affected
to about the same extent by the long-term effect (as proxied by past conflict dura-
tion). One might think that, in combination, this would imply that men are more
adversely affected by armed conflict than women, thus contradicting the main result
of our study. However, for at least two reasons Li and Wen's results do not allow
such a conclusion (and we stress that they themselves do not draw such a conclu-
sion). First, the estimated coefficients for botb conflict dummies and past conflict
duration on male mortality are not statistically significantly different from the
estimated coefficients on female mortality. Second, and more importantly, by focus-
ing on adult mortality, they leave out children and the elderly; thus no conclusions
on the differential gender effect of armed conflict on the entire population can be
drawn.
Several more papers have studied variation in life expectancy, mostly in a cross-
national setting, but without addressing the impact of armed conflict.-- These stud-
ies inform our choice of control variables (see the section on research design below).
19. Murray 1994 discusses the technicat basis of DALYs.
20. Davis and Kuritsky 2002.
21. Li and Wen 2005.
22. See Hertz. Heberl, and Landon 1994; Williamson and Boehmer 1997; Kennelly, O'Shea, and
Garvey 2003; and Bossuyt et al. 2004.
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In particular, they point toward the importance of controlling for per capita income,
basic education, and the participation of women in economic life. However, little
social science research has specifically addressed female life expectancy, let alone
the gender gap in life expectancy.^'
Conflict and the Gender Gap in Life Expectancy
Wars kill, before, during, and after military operations take place. Before the actual
conflict starts, military expenditures often rise and drag scarce resources away from
health services and medical care. During conflict, the most obvious victims are
the casualties directly attributable to conflict. Both soldiers and civilians suffer
morbidity and mortality inflicted by wounds. The direct effects of combat and
military operations are likely to affect men more. Because most soldiers in most
armies are male, men should be more severely affected hy the direct causes of war
than women. The more civilians are directly killed by military operations, the more
women will be directly killed as well.-"* But there is no reason to presume that
more women than men are killed in combat. Yet the major losses of life and other
negative public health effects can be the indirect consequences of armed conflict.
Indirect effects of wars on life expectancy result from various sources. Armed con-
flict both generates conditions for increased morbidity and mortality and weakens
the capacity for dealing with the increase in adverse health conditions.-^
The many indirect negative consequences on health and mortality are likely to
affect men and women differently, partly because of biological rea.sons, but mainly
because of variation in the socioeconomic status of men and women. In the fol-
lowing subsections, we identify three indirect effects that account for the fact that
militarized conflicts unevenly affect men and women. We refer to these effects as
the economic damage e_ffeci, the displacement ejfecl, and the sexual violence effect.
Clearly, these effects are nol independent but may ea.sily reinforce one another,
thereby rendering the situation more dramatic for the people involved. Keeping
these interaction effects in mind, it is for explanatory purposes that we discuss the
three effects separately and in turn. After this discussion, the theoretical section
concludes with a discussion of why the identified effects can be expected to be
particularly strong when armed conflict has ethnic roots or takes place in a coun-
try in which the central political order has collapsed.
23. Williamson and Boehmer 1997.
24. It is difficult lo estimate reliably ihe .share of civilian victims of armed conflici. The often quoted
statistic [hat this share increased from 14 perceni during Worid War ! to 67 perceni in World War II,
reaching 75 percent and 90 percent during the armed conflicts of the 1980s and 199O.s (which were
predotninanily civil wars), respectively, is based on shaky empirical evidence, as Murray et al. 2002,
346f, have poinied out.
25. Foege 1997.
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The Economic Damage Effect
Armed confiicts affect all aspects of life, including the economy. They often lead
to the destruction of agricultural systems causing food shortages. Food shortage
leads to rising food prices, which in crucial cases may cause famines. As observed
by Dreze and Sen, famine is a problem of food distribution and poverty rather
than a problem resulting from an absolute lack of food.-^ In addition to damage to
agriculture and systems of food distribution, armed confiict damages the basic infra-
structure such that access to electricity, safe water, and sanitation is impeded. In
many conflicts, the warring parties actively and explicitly target the infrastructure,
with the consequence that drinking water, sewage and sanitation facilities, power
plants, communication lines, and the basic health infrastructure are severely dam-
aged and cease to function reliably. This strategy is supposed to lead to chaos and
social disorder, destabilizing the opposite party. It is not entirely new, as age-old
military strategies have included blockading food, burning crops, and introducing
infectious diseases to cities under siege.^^ However, King and Martin argue that
advances in military strategy and technology have led to "increasingly severe pub-
lic health consequences of war,"^^ while Garfield and Neugut state that "modem
weaponry and tactics extend the battlefield to the entire society, including
civilians." '^^
Particularly problematic to the civilian population is damage to the medical and
health care infrastructure. Hospitals and pharmacies are destroyed; doctors and
nurses have fled the country or have been killed. Economic collapse and a short-
age of public funds lead to severe underfunding and underprovision of both pri-
vate and puhlic health services. Even emergency medical problems fail to be
attended to on time, while fundamental prevention policies with long-term benefi-
cial health effects such as immunization and monitoring programs are simply ter-
minated. For example, a WHO report on the medical situation in Bosnia between
1992 and 2000 concludes: "Pharmaceutical supply during the war and postwar
period was mostly channeled through humanitarian aid programs, covering up
to 70% of supplies—according to some estimates. In a large number of cases,
this heavily influenced the choice of therapy, which often depended on the kind
and quantity of drugs available."^'' With other countries less easy to reach and
with some militarized conflicts being less present in the media, one should expect
these problems to mount. However, not only does the provision of health services
decline in conflicts, often medical equipment is destroyed. In the same study, the
WHO estimates that about 40 percent of medical equipment was out of use during
and after the civil war in Bosnia. As a consequence, prices of medicines and
26. Dr&ze and Sen 1990.
27. Ashford and Huei-Vaughn 1997.
28. King and Martin 2001, 2.
29. Garfield and Neugut 1997, 35. See also Roberts et al. 2004.
30. WHO 2004, 1.
730 Intemational Organization
health services increase so rapidly that the poorer parts of the population can no
longer afford medication and are often doomed to die even from otherwise trivial
diseases.
With agricultural systems as well as infrastructure damaged, it is no wonder
that armed confiicts have a significant effect on average income levels and the
economic growth rate. Estimates of the effect of intemational and civil war on per
capita income and the growth rate typically find a significant and robu.st negative
influence.^' Collier estimates that per capita income declines at an average annual
rate of 2.2 percent relative to its counterfactual during civil wars.'^ This is the
average effect of civil war on per capita income. In some cases, and with civil
wars sometimes lasting decades rather than years, ihe economic damage can he
far more severe. For instance, the per capita income in Nicaragua at the onset of
the civil war was $4,276. At the end of the civil war, per capita income had declined
to $1,913, which represents an annual decline in per capita income of about 6.5
percent—compared to the average growth rate of 2.5 percent after the civil war,
the relative loss in wealth was almost 10 percent per year. During the Nicaraguan
civil war, the ratio of women's to men's life expectancy increased between 1978
and 1979 (indicating that most combatant victims were male) but declined in the
later years—probably indicating thai the indirect losses of the civil war outnum-
bered the direct losses and that most indirect victims were female.
In addition to loss in average incomes, wars influence the absolute and relative
price levels. The majority of the population, for which income does not keep up
with inflation, has increasing difficulties in meeting their basic needs. Price increases
are most severe for goods for which demand reacts least elastically on price
increa.ses—in other words: goods that are most desperately needed: clean water,
food, electric power, and medication.
Why is the economic damage caused by armed confiict likely to affect women
more than men? Women are likely to suffer more from an increase in food prices
and famines than men. For physiological reasons, women are particularly suscep-
tible to vitamin and iron deficiencies in diets. In addition, in male-dominated soci-
eties, males get priority in food distribution at the expense of girls and women.
The decline in basic health care hits women more because of their specific repro-
ductive roles. Damage caused to the health infrastructure reduces obstetrical care
and increases the number of miscarriages as well as maternal and infant mortality.^-'
For example, a recent study hy the Intemational Red Cross indicated an extraor-
dinarily high maternal mortality rate of 3 percent in the rebel-con trolled areas of
civil war-ridden Congo. The high levels of maternal mortality are associated with
early sexuality and motherhood (the teenagers of less than twenty years contribute
20 percent to the total fertility), too many pregnancies and births (the total is esti-
il. See Collier t999; Murdoch and Sandier 2002; and Gyimah-Brempong and Coriey 2005.
32. Collier 1999.
33. Ashford and Huet-Vaughn 1997. ^
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mated at seven children per woman), unspaced pregnancies (the average period
between two births is less than two years), motherhood at a late age, and induced
clandestine abortions associated with unwanted pregnancies that affect 30 percent
of the teenagers.'^ This poor health care situation in civil war-torn regions already
accounts for a severe drop in the life expectancy of women in the Congo.
More generally, a significant decline in purchasing power will affect women
differently than men because in many cultures men receive preferential access to
resources. When resources become scarcer, then the part of the population suffer-
ing from discrimination is necessarily hit even harder. Many of the negative effects
of armed conflict on women are thus not due to biological reasons, but are due to
what Carpenter calls "preexisting gendered social structures."-^^ For example, the
extra burden of securing water, food, and wood for heating purposes, which comes
on top of caring and nurturing their family, often falls on women and exposes
them to many dangers. Thus in societies where female discrimination is wide-
spread even during peacetime, women will suffer particularly strongly from the
destructive power of violent conflict.'''
The Displacement Effect
Armed conflict often dislocates people from their usual homes, crowding them
into remaining shelters. Worse still, often they have to leave their home cities or
villages and have to seek refuge in makeshift refugee tent camps—either in for-
eign countries across the border or as internally displaced persons (IDPs). As a
consequence, infectious diseases such as diarrhea, measles, acute respiratory dis-
eases, and malaria, but also sexually transmitted diseases including HIV/AIDS,
spread more easily, often turning into epidemics. Weakened and fragile individu-
als die more easily from diseases they might have survived in better physical and
mental conditions.
Health conditions are particularly poor in refugee camps. Toole reports mortal-
ity rates from refugee camps that are up to 100 times higher than the normal mor-
tality rate in the affected country." IDP refugee camps can be particularly severely
hit if they are geographically close to zones of ongoing conflict as people are either
directly affected by the fighting or the ongoing conflict delays and impedes assis-
tance. Data disaggregated according to gender is rare, but Tooie reports data from
a Burmese refugee camp in Bangladesh where female infants were twice as likely
to die than male infants and the mortality rates of females above the age of five
was 3.5 times higher than that of males.^ ** While we do not argue that women
34. UN 2003. 41.
35. Carpenter 2004. 243.
36. See ICRC 2001: and UN 2002.
37. Toole 1997.
38. Wotnen are not only more likely to die from the dire conditions in refugee camps, they also
possibly account for the largest average share of camp population.
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would have been better off if they had not fled into refugee camps, there can nev-
ertheless be little doubt that the mortality differences in these camps can be sig-
nificant. This situation can become exacerbated if culturally binding norms allow
certain fonns of female hygienic care only under conditions of privacy and sepa-
ration from men, which are often impossible to maintain in refugee camps.
Though there is little reason to formulate a deterministic negative influence of
displacement in militarized conflicts on the gender gap in life expect<mcy, we believe
that the probabilistic argument is fairly strong. With an increased number of dis-
placed persons, the gender gap in life expectancy is likely to decline, because of
the health conditions in refugee camps and the possible overrepresentation of
women in these camps.
-t
The Sexual Violence Effect . : . • • •
A third effect is due to the targeted infliction of violence on women as part of a
"gender ideology."-^^ Girls and women become the victims of sex trafficking and
are forced to serve in military brothels or endure other forms of sexual slavery.
Though all figures must be treated with caution, estimates amount to organized
and systematic rape of at least 20,000 women and girls by the Serbian military
and the murder of many of the victims during the civil war in Bosnia.""' At the
same time, there is evidence that young Bosnian and, later on. Kosovo Albanian
males fit for battle were specifically targeted for killing by Serbian militia to extin-
guish armed resistance."" Still, women have been targeted and victimized to such
an extent during the Balkan conflicts that so-called gender crimes form part of the
crimes against humanity prosecuted by the Intemational Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).'*'^  Similarly, Article 7 of the newly established Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) includes "rape, sexual slavery,
enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form
of sexual violence of comparable gravity" among crimes against humanity open
to prosecution.
Reports on systematic rapes and murders of women in relation to war are by no
means limited to Bosnia. In other conflicts, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa,
rape was used with the intention of spreading HIV/AIDS and other sexually trans-
mitted diseases. Injuries to vagina! tissue is a common consequence of rape and
renders affected women much more susceptible to sexually transmitted diseases.
In principle, women should enjoy special protection in armed conflict. The Geneva
Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War from
1950 requires that civilians "shall he at all times humanely treated, and shall be
39. Carpenter 2004, 237.
40. Stiglmayer and Faber 1994.
41. See Carpenter 2002; and Jones 2004.
42. See Askin 1997; and UN 2002.
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protected especially against acts of violence," while women "shall be especially
protected against any attack on their honor, in particular against rape, enforced
prostitution, or any form of indecent assault" (Article 27). However, many war-
ring parties simply do not obey their obligations under the Geneva Convention
and other humanitarian law, which has prompted the UN's Security Council to
call on "all parties to armed conflict to take special measures to protect women
and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual
abuse, and all other forms of violence in situations of armed conflict."*^
The Role of Ethnicity and Collapse of Political Order
The economic damage effect, displacement effect, and the sexual violence effect
can be expected to be particularly strong where armed conflict takes place in a
country where the political order has collapsed or where conflict has ethnic roots.
A collapse of political order almost by definition means that the central govern-
ment is no longer capable of providing even the most hasic infrastructure and other
public goods, not least because it no longer commands over an effective tax sys-
tem."*^  Without being able to raise sufficient revenues, the government cannot com-
bat imminent social catastrophes, even if it is willing to do so. Often, civil wars
are the reason for a country to develop into a failed state, but it is as important to
note that civil wars also tend to be more dirty and intense in failed states. Col-
lapse, disintegration, and armed conflict have occurred in the former Soviet Union,
the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Central Africa. In all instances, dozens of political
entities emerged, in which self-appointed political leaders struggle among each
other and with entities of overlapping claims. As a consequence, failed states can
no longer perform basic functions such as education, security, or governance. In
these countries, civil wars do not take place between insurgents and government
troops, but between different paramilitary groups competing for political control
of the country or particular regions. Such a civil war between various warlords,
whose prime interest is mostly in arms and drug trafficking for short-term profit
maximization, often tums out to cost many more civilian victims than militarized
conflicts between the govemments and groups that aim at taking over political
control.
In the burgeoning literature on failed states. Sierra Leone often serves as an
example.^ *^ Between the mid-1970s and the late-1990s, government revenues
declined from approximately $250 million to less than $10 million. In some failed
states such as Somalia, civil disorder ultimately led to famine as food distribution
systems broke down. More generally, eight of the ten countries that have the high-
43. UN 2000, par. 9.
44. Roiberg 2002 and 2004.
45. See Reno 2003; and Krasner 2004.
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est share of undernourished population according to Food and Agriculture Orga-
nization (FAO) data—Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Mozam-
bique, Liberia, and Sierra Leone—frequently went through cycles of autocratic
government, ethnic conflict, and political failure."*^
Ethnic conflict also increases the likelihood that governments will treat foreign
help with political reservations, even if the emergency is caused by natural fac-
tors. After the devastating tsunami in December 2004 that caused deaths in eleven
countries, the Indonesian govemment was most reluctant to accept foreign assis-
tance even though the province Banda Aceh, location of a civil conflict with eth-
nic roots, was hit harder than any other coastal strip around the Indian Ocean.
This behavior mirrors the dismissive policies of the Sudanese government during
the ongoing civil war in Darfur, which also has ethnic roots. The Sudanese gov-
ernment not only denied carrying out miUtary operations against the rebels, but
also strongly opposed humanitarian intervention by the UN, while the Janjaweed
militias have been reported of killing civilians, mass rape of women, and looting
property.
Conflicts in failed states are also likely to generate higher numbers of refugees
and internally displaced people because the central authority can no longer guar-
antee anything resembling security in many areas.'^ ^ Conflicts with ethnic origin
can also be expected to generate higher refugee flows because the very intention
of warfare is often the ethnic cleansing of certain regions (if not the whole coun-
try) from other ethnic groups. Neumayer reports a strong effect of civil and ethnic
wars as well as coUap.se of state authority on asylum migration to Westem Europe,
which is likely to be highly correlated with refugee flows to neighboring countries
as well as intemal displacement.^" Davenport, Moore, and Poe find that ethnically
motivated genocidal conflicts drastically increase the number of refugees and inter-
nally displaced persons.^" Of the seven countries with the highest number of inter-
nally displaced to resident populations in 2002 according to the Norwegian Refugee
Council—Azerbaijan, Lebanon, Burundi, Sierra Leone, Bosnia Herzegovina, Sudan,
and Angola—all of them experienced a militarized ethnic conflict, and in five coun-
tries the political control collapsed.'^" Hence, five of these seven countries com-
bined ethnic conflicts with a breakdown of political control; and while Azerbaijan
and Sudan maintained political control, one can doubt whether this control extended
over the entire territory of the country. On average, the relation between the eth-
nic roots of conflict, state failure and the number of displaced persons appears to
be quite strong.
The sexual violence effect of armed conflict is facilitated by the fact that many
militarized conflicts lead to a partial or complete collapse of political order. The
46. FAO 2005.
47. Rotberg 2002 and 20(M.
48. Neumayer 21)05.
49. Davenport. Moore, and Poe 2003.
50. Norwegian Refugee Council 2002, 5.
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absence of a rule of law hits the vulnerable most severely. At the same time, reports
on systematic rapes and rape-related murder of women, forced impregnation, and
forced abortion are particularly abundant during ethnic wars. In such conflicts,
sexual violence serves as a means of ethnic cleansing, terrorization, and humilia-
tion, not only of the violated women, but also the men of the same ethnic group
who are forcibly demonstrated their failure to protect "their" women. Sexual vio-
lence against women thus serves as an important signal "from man to man," wound-
ing the men of the opposing ethnic group in their masculinity by marking them as
incompetent.^' Intlicting sexual violence on women from other ethnic groups also
serves as an assault on "the honor of the community and for defiling women who
are entrusted by the community to maintain the purity of lineage."*^- The mere
threat of widespread rape is often enough to prompt women and their families to
leave certain places and flee elsewhere, as happened in the Kosovo, and can thus
be employed as a means of ethnic cleansing.^' But because the destruction of the
other ethnic group's culture and identity is as important in ethnic wars as gains of
land, targeting violence on women can form an important strategy of war also
because of women's central role in culture and family structures.^'' Wars with eth-
nic roots are aiso likely to affect more people on both sides as the appeal to ethnic
kinship facilitates mobilization of one's own group and hatred for the other. In
addition, they are also likely to last longer and are more difficult to end. Some
studies find that civil wars with ethnic roots last much longer than other types of
civil wars.^'' Our sample contains fourteen ethnic conflicts and four nonethnic con-
flicts with a duration of over ten years, with most long-lasting nonethnic civil wars
taking place in Central American countries.
Hypotheses
Social phenomena such as civil wars can hardly be explained by deterministic
theories. Our discussion of the link between militarized confiict and the gender
gap in life expectancy is no exception to the rule. Yet the preceding discussion has
identified three effects that make a negative influence of militarized conflict on
the gender gap in life expectancy probable. In particular, we have explained how
and why the economic consequences of war, the displacement effect and the sex-
ual violence effect are likely to jointly affect women more adversely than men.
Taking the probabilistic nature of our theory into consideration, we derive the fol-
lowing testable hypotheses from the above discussion:
51. Seifcrt 1994,58.
52. Liz Kelly, cited in Shoemaker 2001, 8.
53. Shoemaker 2001.
54. Seiferl 1994.
55. See Fearon 2004; and DeRouen and Sobek 2004.
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HI: Armed conflict is likely to decrease the gender gap in life expectancy.
H2: Armed conflict is likely to decrease the gender gap more strongly if the
confiict has ethnic origins.
H3: Armed confiict is likely to decrease the gender gap more strongly if confiict
takes place in a country in which the central political order has collapsed.
The following section puts these hypotheses to empirical test. "^
Research Design ,.
In the last section we argued that while most direct victims are men, women are
likely to suffer more from the indirect adverse consequences of international and
civil wars. We measure these adverse consequences by life expectancy. But life
expectancy and the gender gap are a product of multiple influences^—^geographical,
social, economical, and political—that one would need to control for to test our
hypotheses. Not ail determinants of life expectancy are easy to measure. Geograph-
ical influences such as the likelihood of acquiring malaria are not equal across
countries. A simple cross-sectional analysis of life expectancy is likely to suffer
from omitted variable bias, or, if we were to collect data on the national propen-
sities of serious diseases, would suffer from potentially severe measurement errors.
To deal with (he various estimation problems, we have opted for gathering inter-
nationally comparable panel data of life expectancy. The main advantage of
relying on panel data is that only pooled data allows controlling for unobserved
factors that vary across countries and are possibly correlated with our explanatory
variables. Fixed effects estimators eliminate bias from omitted time-invariant vari-
ables and also remove the level effects of time-varying omitted variables. Unfor-
tunately and inevitably, the dynamic effects of omitted time-varying variables may
still bias the estimates.
To our knowledge, the most reliable source for life expectancy data in panel
form is provided by the U.S. Census's International Data Base (IDB). In compar-
ison, for example, to data provided by the World Bank,''*' the IDP is much better
maintained and has by far less missing data. The IDP was created for scientific
purposes—in response to the information requirements of Intemational Program
Center (IPC) staff to meet the needs of organizations that sponsor research efforts.
The IDB combines data from country sources (especially censuses and surveys)
56. World Bank 2004.
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with IPC's estimates and projections, which are based on available census data
and group cohort population projection techniques to compute data between the
censuses. These projections are based on country-specific fixed-slope logistic inter-
polations in the years between national censuses. Moreover, recent population and
socioeconomic trends are taken into account *if the projected trends are plausi-
ble."^^ For instance, the projection of fertility takes into account trends in age at
marriage, the percentage of women using contraception, and existence and scof>e
of family-planning programs; and data on educational attainment are used in life
expectancy calculations.
We nevertheless should expect that analyses of IDB data to some extent suffer
from correlated errors, because models that are used to predict the values of a
certain variable cannot avoid systematic error. Our analyses inherit these system-
atic errors. To avoid seriously biased estimates, we use a lagged dependent vari-
able approach, which sufficiently eliminates serially correlated errors. As explained
in the literature review, the new WHO data on DALYs lost represent a compre-
hensive and data-intensive measure and with less measurement errors than a life
expectancy measure, but the disadvantage is that DALYs are not yet available over
a longer period of time, allowing only a cross-sectional analysis. A cross-sectional
analysis does not allow controlling for time-invariant country-specific omitted
variables. For these reasons, we prefer data that allows more advanced estimation
techniques over cross-sectional data with less measurement errors. Also, while non-
adjusted life expectancy is theoretically inferior to disability adjusted life expec-
tancy, we note that the WHO itself has pointed out that the two are highly
correlated.'^ *' In conclusion, in the absence of panel data on adjusted life expec-
tancy, we believe that nonadjusted life expectancy is the single most relevant aggre-
gate measure of public health, which has the important advantage of relatively
good over-time and across-country data availability.
The IDB data base provides information on life expectancy for 145 countries
and for the years between 1975 and 2002. However, the panel is not balanced,
that is, the amount of information available for each country may vary. Next, we
will first briefly introduce the data. Then we discuss the estimation problems and
the remedies in greater detail. The following sections present the results of our
analyses.
Variables and Data Sources
We use data from various sources. As we explained before, the dependent vari-
able, gender differences in life expectancy, comes from the U.S. Census's IDP
data base. Life expectancy varies greatly in the sample we analyze. The mean life
expectancy across countries is slightly above sixty-one years, but varies between
57. U.S. Census 2004, B5.
58. Mathers etal. 2001, fig. 4.
738 Intemational Organization
thirty-seven years in Angola and eighty years in Japan. Over time, average life
expectancy has increased from approximately fifty years in 1970 to sixty-five years
in 2002.
We use as our dependent variable the ratio rather than the absolute difference of
female to male life expectancy. The reason is thai, under certain conditions,^''
changes in the absolute difference of female to male life expectancy can be a mis-
leading indicator of the health effects of events. Therefore, if we measured the
gender gap as the absolute difference between the life expectancies of men and
women, it is possible that even though an equal number of men and women die,
the gender gap is still decreasing. This, in turn, implies that it is possible that male
and female life expectancy can decrease by the same number of years and yet
more men had died than women. Furthermore, equal proportional decreases in
male and female life expectancy will lead to a larger absolute fall in the life expec-
tancy of the gender with the higher ex ante life expectancy—typically the female
life expectancy. This problem is accounted for if we measure the gender gap as
the ratio of female to male life expectancy. To be on the safe side, we additionally
add the absolute change in population life expectancy as a regressor. In simula-
tions, we found that using the life expectancy ratio and controlling for the abso-
lute changes in population life expectancy removes the distortions that result from
the computation of life expectancies,**
Figure 1 displays the distribution of the ratio of female to male life expectancy
across countries.
In 100 out of 2,956 country-years, men lived longer than women (hence the
ratio of life expectancies in percent is smaller than 100). In Bangladesh, India,
and Nepal, this phenomenon is common and can possibly be attributed to the tra-
ditional cultural bias against females in these countries. In all other cases a "'neg-
ative gender gap"—that is, men living longer than women—is the exception rather
than the rule. The highest men-women incline (in our sample) was reported from
Sudan in 1988. This was also the time when the civil war in the south had caused
a large refugee movement to the cities, especially to Khartoum. In September 1988
the WHO estimated the total number of refugees as up to 750,000, among which a
large portion suffered from severe undemutrition.*"' On the other end of the spec-
59. Changes in mortality rates of a specific age cohort affect also person-years lived of older age
cohorts due to changes to the number of survivors to older age, und this h;is a larger effect on life
expectancy ai birth if the life expectancy of the age cohort is higher. See Preston. Hcuveline, and
Giiillfil 2(KM, 64. Militarized conHiL-t.s lead to relatively larger changes in the gender gap in life expec-
tancy if the persons killed have not yet reached age cohorts that show targe gender differences in
mortality rates. For example, if most individuals killed in a war are below thirty years old. and if
women above thirty are less likely to die at a certain age than men of the same age and women's life
expectancy at birth is higher, then ihe change in the absolute difference between female and male life
expectancy is a biased proxy for the mortality rates of that conllicl.
61). For technical details on life expectancy computation, see <http://maihworld.wolfram.com/
LifeExpectancy.html). Accessed 28 April 2(K>6.
6!. Toote and Waldman 1988.
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trum, the absolute difference in female to male life expectancy is largest in post-
transition Russia. The life expectancy difference between Russian women and men
peaked in 1994 reaching an extraordinary 13.74 years. Reasons were manifold.^^
Noteworthy, countries from the former Soviet Republic hold forty-eight of the top
fifty country-years in term.s of gender gap. In all cases, women lived about sev-
enty to seventy-five years wbile men on average died at the age of sixty or before.
if we consider the ratio of female to male life expectancy, then posttransition Rus-
sia also has some of the highest values, but Cambodia tops the list. Due to Pol
Pot's killing fields, during the years 1975 to 1978 the life expectancies of both
genders become extremely low, but female life expectancy is almost 50 percent
higher than male life expectancy.
As our measures of civil war, we rely on Fearon and Laitin's coding of civil
wars.**^  Fearon and Laitin count an armed conflict between a state and an orga-
nized, nonstate group as a civil war if the conflict leads to at least 1,000 battle deaths
62. While Andreev el al. 2003 hold the Russian health care system responsible, other sources report
a steep increase in alcohol abuse and deaths from organized crime; see McKee 1999.
63. Fearon and Laitin 2003. We updated their data from 1999 up to 2002.
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over the course of conflict with a yearly average of at least 100 deaths following
initial onset. This definition has the advantage of ruling out minor clashes, while
at the same time not excluding intermediate conflicts, typically excluded by alter-
native sources, such as the Correlates of War (COW) project.^ Fearon and Laitin
also distinguish between ethnic and nonethnic civil wars, which we need to test our
second hypothesis. Unfortunately, there is no coding of international war that uses
fully compatible rules. However, our source for international conflict, the Uppsala/
PRIO Armed Conflict Database, allows coding of intemational conflict that is sim-
ilar to Fearon and Laitin's coding rules for civil war. An international confiict is
counted if it reached at least twenty-five battle deaths in any one year in addition
to an accumulated total of at least 1,000 deaths."'* Note that we have adjusted the
original data such that the reference point for coding is whether the conflict takes
place on the territory of a country. A conflict is not coded for a country participat-
ing in a conflict outside its territory. Thus, for example, the NATO war on Yugo-
slavia is coded as a conflict for Yugoslavia, but not for the participating NATO
countries. The reason for this recoding is that, apart from direct batile deaths, con-
flict participation in foreign countries is unlikely to affect life expectancy much,
whereas the country of conflict location experience.s the full direct and indirect con-
sequences on life expectancy in general and on the gender gap in particular.
Information on collapse of the political order is taken from the Polity project,
which codes both the democracy and the autocracy score " - 7 7 " when coders
observed "a complete collapse of central political authority."^ To capture socio-
economic differences across countries we include gross domestic product (GDP)
per capita, literacy, and the female labor force participation rate.*'"' These three
variables are supposed to catch the effects of three different dimensions, each of
which being directly related to individual well-being: income, education, and gen-
der equality. We further include the autocracy score and durability of political
regimes, boih from the Polity data base in the list of regres.sors.^ ''* Regime durabil-
ity is defined as the number of years since the most recent three-point change on
the polity score or the end of transition from a period of lack of stable political
institutions. Other socioeconomic variables, such as health expenditures, access to
food, safe water and clean sanitation, income inequality, and the degree of eco-
nomic freedom typically have poor data availability if they are measurable at all
and are highly correlated with the variables we explicitly control for or with the
country-specific fixed effects.
64. See (http://www.correlatesofwar.org/). Accessed 15 March 2006.
63. Strand, Wilhelmsen, and Gleditsch 2004. Recently, there have been attetnpts to develop cardi-
nal estimates of battle deaths—see, for example, Doyle and Sambanis 2000; and Lacina and Gleditsch
2005. The validity and reliability of these estimates are currently still unclear and we leave using these
cardinal measures for future research.
66. See (www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity). Accessed 15 March 2006.
67. Data from World Bank 2004.
68. See (www.cidcm.umd.edu/mscr/polity/>. Accessed 15 March 2006.
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Finally, we add a series of dummy variables that—though imperfectly—seek to
catch the effects of natural disasters {earthquake, storms, tsunamis, and so on) and
epidemics (HIV/AIDS) on life expectancy. In both cases, we use crude proxies
that aim at reducing errors rather than capturing the variance across countries. For
natural disasters, we use data from the Emergency Disasters Data Base (EM-
DAT).^'' We code the variable I if the number of victims of a disaster reported by
EM DAT exceeds 10,000. Along similar lines, we code the HIV/AIDS variable 1
if the share of people living with HIV/AIDS to total population aged fifteen to
forty-five exceeds 10 percent, a level at which it is said to have become epidem-
ic.^" Appendix 1 provides summary descriptive variable information.
This list of regressors is perhaps incomplete. One should keep in mind, how-
ever, that we control for correlation with fixed effects of all variables with suffi-
cient within variation. Of course, there can always exist an omitted time-varying
variable whose within variance is highly correlated with the within variance of
one of these regressors. We cannot rule out the possibihty that such a variable
exists, hut we are not aware of one.
Estimation Procedure
Mirroring our theoretical expectations, we are particularly interested in uncondi-
tional and conditional effects of armed conflict on the gender gap in life expec-
tancy over the entire conflict period. In principle, it would be useful to distinguish
between immediate and lagged effects of conflict. Unfortunately, this is rendered
difficult given that conflict data is only discrete and most conflicts last longer than
one year. We observe an average conflict duration of 2.77 years for international
wars, 7.53 years for nonethnic civil wars, and 11.71 years for ethnic civil wars in
our sample. In seven countries—Colombia, Chad, Ethiopia, Sudan, India, the Phil-
ippines, and Indonesia—the civil war spans over the entire observation period. A
lagged conflict variable would therefore be highly collinear with the contempora-
neous conflict variable, which then results in inefficient estimation. Estimation of
dummy variables within a lagged dependent variable (LDV) model is even more
problematic, because the lagged dependent variable reduces the efficiency of the
estimation already. Furtber adding the lagged values of a dummy regressor would
only lead to unreliable estimates.
The fact that armed conflicts and especially civil wars often have a long dura-
tion has some advantages as well, however. This is because our coefficients esti-
mate the effects of conflict on life expectancy over the entire conflict periods and
thus cover some of the long-term effects of conflict. Ufe expectancy data is more
problematic for estimating short-term effects of conflict because census data for
single years of intense conflict often does not exist and the influence of unexpected
69. See (www.em-dal.net). Accessed 15 March 2006.
70. Data from UNDP 2004.
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shocks on Ufe expectancy is notoriously hard to estimate and therefore tends to be
unreliable. Specitically, we found life expectancy data in the years of genocides
hardly consistent with reported evidence. For example, while Verwimp reports
household-level data that suggests that men were more likely to be killed during
the genocide in Rwanda than women,^' the U.S. census's life expectancy data
reports a small decline in the gender gap: while life expectancy of men declined
from 45.1 to 41.1 years between 1993 and 1995, female life expectancy declined
by 4.8 years from 47.2 to 42.4 years over the same period (implying that the ratio
of female to male life expectancy decreased from 104.6 lo 103.2 percent during
those years}.^^ However, life expectancy data allows more precise estimates of the
total effects of armed conflict over the entire conflict period, because it captures
not only the direct but also the indirect casualties of war. Often these indirect casu-
alties of armed conflict find little attention in the media and in academic research.
Life expectancy data may help to unveil these long-term effects.
Basically, the estimation procedure we employ compares average change in the
gender gap in life expectancy in conflict countries with the average change in the
gender gap in nonconflict countries. However, the interpretation of our estimation
coefficients is slightly more complex. To capture the explainable level differences
between countries we add the lagged dependent variable to the right-hand-side
variables. With a coefficient of approximately 0.9, our dependent variable is "quasi-
differenced"—as econonietricians dubbed it.
An unbiased and etficient estimation has to resolve a serie.s of econometric com-
plications. We di.scuss the most important problems in turn. To start with, panel
data analyses are typically hampered by the notorious problem of serially corre-
lated errors. Unfortunately, serial correlation may have many sources. A wrongly
specified model, false assumptions about lagged effects of explanatory variables,
persistent effects, and related problems all may lead to autocorrelation. Broadly
speaking, the literature provides two ways to deal with autocorrelation. The first
approach seeks to exactly model the dynamics of all variables and has clear advan-
tages in time-series analyses. In panel data, however, it is likely that unit-specific
dynamics exist. In this case, the first approach would lead to estimates that at best
capture the average dynamics over all units. Therefore, most dynamic analyses of
panel data have relied on the second approach and treated autocorrelation as nui-
sance. Researchers aim at estimating unbiased coefficients without carefully mod-
eling the dynamics of the explanatory variables. The LDV approach, on which we
rely, is the most prominent example of the second group.
In addition, a fixed-effects model is required if omitted variables or initial vari-
ance exists that are correlated with at least one explanatory variable. However,
71. Verwimp 2003.
72. Men were possibly the main target in other historical events of large-scale genocides as well,
even though this is contested—see the conlributions in Jones 2(H>4. In sensiiiviiy analy.sis we found
that it makes little difference to our estimates if we drop observations from years of and surrounding
events of geniKide from the data based on information contained in Hiirff 2003.
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scholars have frequently argued that fixed effects models may "throw the baby out
with the bathwater" because they completely abandon the between variance.^^ The
estimation of rarely changing variables becomes highly inefficient—.so inefficient
that point estimates can be extremely biased. This is important because militarized
conflict must be classified as a rarely changing variable. Specifically, conflict is
extremely rare with a within variance between 0.009 (international war) and 0.054
(civil war). Estimation of the impact of conflict on life expectancy by a fixed-
effects model can lead to coefficients far off the true coefficients. Moreover, nat-
ural disasters of a given magnitude are even less frequent. In all these cases, we
cannot expect to obtain unbiased point estimates using a fixed effects approach.
Hsiao and Plumper and Troeger have suggested a remedy for this type of esti-
mation problem.^^ Plumper and Troeger—in brief—propose using a three-stage
estimator to obtain unbiased estimates of variables that have enough within vari-
ance to allow efficient e.stimation while at the same time estimating rarely chang-
ing variables by pooled ordinary least .squares (OLS). This technique thus trades
unhiasedness for efficiency, which in finite samples pays off with more reliable
point estimates if the within variance is really low. Efficient estimation is espe-
cially important if the regressor of interest is an event dummy as in our case.
De-meaning these event dummies leads to extremely inefficient estimation. Units
that show no within-variation over time either because they never experienced a
militarized conflict or because a conflict stretched over the entire period that we
analyze would not contribute to the estimation of the militarized conflict coeffi-
cients/^ As a result, the point estimates would be hardly reliable. We thus esti-
tnate the conflict variables (as well as the natural disaster and the HIV/AIDS
variables that have similar characteristics) using both within and between vari-
ance while at the same time controUing for potential correlation with country fixed
effects for the remaining variables that have enough within variation over time.
Analysis
Mean Sample Effects
Table I presents our estimation results.^'' We report results from two models: A
full sample mode! and a model that excludes countries where HIV/AIDS has
73. Beck and Kat/ 2O01.
74. See Hsiao 2003; 51-53; and Pliimper and Troeger 2004 and 2005.
75. See Plumper. Troeger, and Manow 2005.
76. We have tested whether our dependent variable ha.-; a unit root. Because we analyze an unbal-
anced panel, ihe standard Im, Pesaran, and Shin 2003 test, the most reliable unit root test for panel
data, is not applicable. Instead, we regressed the gender gap on its lagged value In an otherwise empty
fixed effects model. We then u.se an F4est to test whether the estimated coefficient equals I. This is
68.81 in the full sample and 131.77 in the sample where the high HIV prevalence countries are excluded,
significantly rejecting the null. We thus do not consider the possibility of a unit root further.
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TABLE 1. Determinants of the dependent variable GENDER GAP IN LIFE
F.XPECTANCY
*
Dependent variable:
Ratio of female ro male life e.vpectancy * l()0
LAGGED GliNDER (UP
CHANGE IN POPULATION LIFE EXPECTANCY
INTERSTATE CONFLICT , ,
riVlI. WAR
INCOME PER CAPrTA > ' . . -. ,
1
AUTOCRATIC INSTrrUTIONS
REGIME DURABILITY
LITERACY RATi;
FEMALE LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION
NATURAL DISASTERS
HIV/AfDS > 10% OF POPULATION 15-45
Intercept
Observations
Countries
F-test
t(eta)
Adjusted R^
L
T-
Model I
{full sample)
0.S899
(0.0088)***
0.0604
(0.0158)*** i
* 0.3835
(0.2047)*
-0.3471
(0.0621)***
0.0000
(0-0000)
0.0260
• (0.0077)***
-0.0042
(0.0016)**
-0.0250
(0.0025)***
0.0428
(0.0043)***
-1.5821
(0.3302)***
-0.7437
(0.0854)***
12.0858
(0.9489)***
18:^6 ' _ •
106
3606.75**"
0.0791***
0.959
Model 2
{HIV epidemic
country-year.s
excluded)
0.8370
(0.01121-**
0.0656
(0.0169)***
-0.4293
(0.2016)*
-O..^212
(0.0613)***
0.0000
(0.0000)
0.0363
• (O.(X)82)***
-0.0014
(0.0017)
-0.0181
(0.0021)***
0.0425
(0.0041)***
-1.7831
(0.3432)***
1, . . . .
17.1981
(1.1842)***
\mi
96
3580.32***
0.0736***
0.960
Note: Standard errors UFL- in parentheses.*^ < 0.05; *V *P ^ O.OOi.
become epidemic (prevalence rates over 10 percent). We will see that the results
are largely robust. Table 1 shows that both intemational and civil conflicts tend to
gradually close the gender gap in life expectancy. Based on Model 1, an interstate
war reduces the ratio of female to male life expectancy by 0.38 percentage points,
a civil war reduces this ratio by 0.34 percentage points. Perbaps surprisingly, wars
between two countries bave a larger average effect on tbe gender gap than civil
wars. Further below, we will see thai tbere are important differences among civil
wars nol yet accounted for. In the restricted sample, the coefficients for interstate
and internal conflict remain statistically significant. Tbe significant coefflcient of
tbe eta, wbich is the unexplained part of the unit fixed effects, suggests that the
estimation still has to account for omitted time-invariant variables.
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Before we explore the relations between the various conflict types and tbe gen-
der gap in life expectancy further, we briefly discuss tbe estimated effects of tbe
control variables. We fmd that wbile a bigber per capita income boosts life expec-
tancy, it does not seem lo make a difference to tbe life expectancy gap between
men and women. Tbe gender gap significantly widens in autocratic regimes. Polit-
ical stability has no effect in the restricted sample, but decreases the gender gap in
tbe full sample. We are not surprised to find tbat female labor force participation
actually widens the gender gap. Of course, women's predisposition for heart attacks
and lung cancer is likely to increase witb higher labor force participation,^^ but
even if tbis is tbe case, the beneficial effects of a more self-determined life seem
to outweigb the disadvantages of workplace stress. Events of natural disasters bave
a qualitatively similar effect to armed conflict, also closing tbe gender gap.^ ** Coun-
tries with a bigh HiV/AIDS prevalence rate have a lower gender gap in life expec-
tancy, all otber things equal. It appears that young women in sub-Sabaran Africa,
the region with the highest prevalence rates, are more likely to become infected
than men.^'' As a consequence, HIV/AIDS has a greater impact on women than
men in developing countries relative to otber causes of disease and disability.**"
Conditional Effects
Not all militarized conflicts are alike— t^o say the least. Some wars are more vio-
lent, some occur in politically unstable countries, some conflicts are etbnically
motivated, and so on. Of course, one could say tbis variance in the severity of
militarized conflicts renders the estimation of mean effects such as those pre-
sented in the previous section meaningless. But that is not true: knowing that
on average women are more affected over tbe entire conflict period is already
interesting.
In the theoretical section, we bave argued that the influence of militarized con-
flict on the gender gap is likely to be influenced by whether tbe conflict bas ethnic
roots and the political autbority in tbe country bas collapsed. In this section we
test these conjectures by estimating individual coefficients for ethnic and noneth-
nic civil conflicts as well as for these conflict types in countries wbere tbe central
political autbority bas collapsed and where it has not (in our sample, no failed
states engaged in international conflict). Table 2 reports the results. It allows an
easy robustness cbeck because we repeat resuits from Model 1 again in tbe first
column.
Observe that our estimates do not vary much following the inclusion of vari-
ables tbat capture conditionality. Most coefficietits of tbe conditional Model 3 do
77. Painpel 2003.
78. We intend to explore the effect of natural disasters on ihe gender gap in life expectancy in more
detail in future research.
79. UN 2002, 20.
80. ICRC 2001, 112.
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TABLE 2. Conditional estimation results (full sample)
Dependent variable:
ratio of female to male life e.xpectanry * 100 Modell Model .f Model 4
LAGGED CENDER GAP
CHANGE IN POPULArtON LIFE EXPECTANCY
INTERSTATE CONFLICT
C I V I L W A R • , , . i • J
NONETHNIC CIVIL WAR
ETHNIC CIVIL WAR
NONETHNIC CIVIL WAR w/o STATE FAILURE
NONETHNIC CIVn WAR IN TAILED STATES
ETHNIC CIVIL W.AR w/O STATE FAILURE
ETHNIC CIVIL WAR IN FAILED STATES
INCOME PER CAPITA
AUTOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS
REGIME DURABILITY
LITERACY RATE
FEMALE LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION
NATURAL DISASTERS i
HIV/AIDS > 109!' OF POPULATION 15-45
Intercept
Observatiotis
Countries
F-test
t(eta)
Adjusted R'
0.8899
(0.0088)*'*
0.0604
(0.0158)***
-0.3835
(0.2047)*
-0.3471
(0.0621)***
L
O.OOOC)
(0.0000)
0.0260
(0.0077)***
-0.0042
(0.0016)**
-0.0250
(0.0025)***
0.0428
(0.0043)***
-I..S82I
(0.3302)***
-0.7437
(0.0854)***
12.0858
(0.9489)***
1836
106
3606.75***
0.0791***
0.959
0.8895
(0.0088)***
0.0609
(0.0158)**'
-0.3388
(0.2050)*
-0.0486
(0.1209)
-0.4122
(0.0677)***
0.0000
(0.0000)
0.0256
(0.0077)**
-0.0039
(0.0017)*
-0.0251
(0.0025)***
0.0431
(0.0043)*'*
-1.5.^33
(0.3306)***
-0.7352
(0.0852)***
12.1190
(0.9530)***
1836
106
3328.32***
0.0792***
(1.959
0.8866
(0.0089)***
0.0613
(0.0158)***
-0.3746
(0.2053)"
-0.0616
(0.1215)
l.O.WI
(0.9711)
-0.4074
(0.0677)***
-0.7925
(0.3258)'
-0.0000
(O.DOOO)
0.0225
(0.0076)***
-0.0030
(0.0016)*
-0.0252
(0.0025)***
0.0429
(0.0043)**
-1.5508
(0.3305)***
-0.7361
(0.0851)***
12.4568
(0.9678)***
1836
106
2890.55***
0,0782***
0.959
Slandard cmitu are in < 0.05; **p < 0,01; "*p < 0.001.
not deviate significantly from the coefficients of the unconditional Model !. When
we di.stinguish between ethnic and nonethnic civil wars, we find that it is only
ethnic civil wars that reduce the gender gap in life expectancy. Of course, one has
to keep in mind that the vast majority of civil wars has ethnic roots. When we
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further di.stinguish between ethnic and nonethnic civil wars taking place in "failed"
states and "nonfaiied" states (Model 4), then we find that it is ethnic wars in failed
states that have the largest impact on the gender gap in life expectancy, reducing
the female to male life expectancy ratio by 0.79 percentage points, whereas the
effect of ethnic civil wars in other countries i.s 0.40 percentage points."' In both
conditional models, the effect of interstate confiict remains statistically signifi-
cant, with an estimated magnitude of between 0.34 and 0.38 percentage points.
To sum up, we found support for our first hypothesis that over the entire con-
fiict period, the gender gap in life expectancy decreases. Our second and third
hypotheses, namely, that this decline is stronger when the confiict has ethnic ori-
gins or the political order collapses, needs to be qualified, however: ethnic civil
wars have an effect that is stronger still in failed states, whereas nonethnic civil
wars do not have any effect. This finding does not necessarily falsify our second
and third hypotheses in respect to nonethnic civil wars. Rather, ethnic civil wars
are more common than nonethnic civil wars and ethnic civil wars are more likely
than nonethnic civil wars to take place in failed states. Therefore, the conditional
estimates for nonethnic civil wars suffer largely from inefficiency. Better state fail-
ure data and more wars may help to improve estimates, but the world would be
much better off if we had to wait a long time before the conditions for efficient
estimation were satisfied.
Conclusion
Militarized conflicts kill in various ways. They kill soldiers and civilians directly,
bul also have important indirect effects and find their victims among the larger
civilian population, killing people that have never crossed the line of fire. We have
argued that women are likely to suffer more from these negative indirect effects
and possibly to an extent that overall they could be more adversely affected by
conflict than men, despite the fact that men naturally are the main direct victims
of war. We have demonstrated that, indeed, on average women suffer more than
men from international and civil wars, as measured by the effect of conflict on the
ratio of female to male life expectancy. This confirms our first hypothesis. The
average decline in the gender gap in life expectancy suggests that the direct and
indirect con.sequences of wars combined either kill more women or that the killed
women are younger on average than the killed men. Findings on our second and
third hypotheses have been more mixed, however. We have found that the effect
on the gender gap is indeed stronger if the civil war has ethnic roots, which con-
s i . To illustrate, assume thai life expectancy in a country i.s 60.0 years for men and 64.8 years for
women (implying a score of 108 on our dependeiil variable). If an ethnic war in a faiied state reduced
men's life expectancy by 2 years to 58.0 years, women's life expectancy would decline by 2.62 years
to 62.18 years.
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flrms our second hypothesis. But the type of civil war matters even more than we
expected because we find that only ethnic civil wars decrease the gender gap,
whereas nonethnic civil wars do not. Similarly, we find that it is only for ethnic
civil wars that the effect on the gender gap becomes stronger if the conflict takes
place in a "failed" state, in accordance with our third hypothesis, hut not for non-
ethnic civil wars. As we explained above, the caveat is that few civil wars are
nonethnic and even fewer civil wars in "failed" states are nonethnic, such that
variation is low and estimation inefficient.
The finding that, on average, conflicts lower the life expectancy of women more
than that of men means that policymakers, nongovernmental organizations, and
the academic community need to pay much closer attention to the hidden, indirect
consequences of conflict, which are both "profound" and "underappreciated."^^
The three recent studies from UN bodies and the International Committee of the
Red Cross mentioned in the introduction represent a first start. Our findings chal-
lenge policymakers and intemational and humanitarian organizations to develop
policies that mitigate and ideally prevent the adverse impact of armed confiict on
women. Such policies have to address the .specific vulnerabilities of women that
follow from severe damage to the health and other infrastructure that result when
a large part of the population has been displaced from their homes and when sex-
ual violence against women forms part of the military strategy employed. While
the priority given to women in emergency evacuations during episodes of armed
confiict might be misguided given the specific vulnerability of noncombatant men
during ongoing conflicts,^^ this does not imply that giving priority to women is
generally misguided. Instead, our findings suggest giving priority to women when
it comes to the indirect and long-term effects of armed conflicts.
Our study opens up important avenues for future research in IR. First, future
research could explore characteristics of confiicts other than the ones looked at
here, which might help explain why some conflicts apparently are so much more
damaging to women, whereas others are not. In the analyses supplementing the
estimates we reported here (see Appendix 2), we found some regional differences
for international wars, but not for ethnic civil wars (only ethnic civil wars in south-
em Africa were estimated to be even more damaging to women than the average
effect). More in-depth case study research might be able to elicit reasons for these
differences. Second, the theoretical justification for our hypotheses can explain
our findings, but future research should provide a better understanding and a more
detailed account on the relative importance of specific channels through which
armed conflict harms women more than men. For example, is damage to the health
infrastructure or damage to agricultural and food distribution systems more impor-
tant? Third, future research should address what role, if any, the effect of armed
conflict on the gender gap in life expectancy plays for the likelihood of extemal
82. Human Security Centre 2004, 18.
83. As demonstrated by Jones 1994. and 2000; and Carpenter 2003.
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policy intervention as well as how extemal intervention impacts on the effect of
armed conflict. Why do multinational peace-keeping forces intervene in some con-
flicts but not in others? Why do international donors attempt to rebuild the coun-
try with the help of enormous sums of development aid and technical assistance
after some conflicts but not others? How is international aid related to the politics
of the government in crisis countries? Do these interventions have a significant
effect on the impact of armed confiict on the gender gap in life expectancy and, if
so, under what conditions?
From a methodological point of view, we believe that future research would
benefit from a more disaggregated and case-study type of approach. On the one
hand, studies are needed that analyze the individual level. For instance, political
scientists and economists should have a better understanding of how government
failure and ethnic conflicts affect the prices of goods of basic need. As yet, we
have a much better understanding on how markets work in good times, but we
know relatively little about the operation of markets in the presence of natural or
man-made disasters. On the other hand, ca.se studies could provide additional
insights into the interdependencies between the various effects of militarized con-
flict and political institutions. For many of the new re.search avenues that could be
taken from this study's results, the quality of data and the number of observations
are likely to be insufficient for macro-level studies to provide interesting results.
Appendix 1, Descriptive Statistics
Vririahles Observations Mean
Standard
deviation Minimum Maximum
GBNDI-R CiAP
CHANGE IN POPULATION
l.rFE EXPECTANCY
PliR TAPITA INCOME
AUTOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS
KKGIME DURABILITY
LITERACY RATE
FEMAi.K LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION
NATURAL niSASTERS
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT
CIVIL WAR
NONETHNIC CIVIL WAR
ETHNir CIVIL WAR
NONETHNIC CIVIL WAR WITHOUT
STATE FAILURE
NONETHNir CIVIL WAR IN FAILED STATES
ETHNIC CIVIL WAR W / o STATE FAILURE
ETHNIf CIVIL WAR IN FAILED STATES
S > ]0% OF POPULATION 1 5 - 4 5
1836 107.31 4.80 yi.O7 128.30
1836
1836
1836
1836
1836
836
1836
1836
1836
1836
1836
836
836
1836
836
836
0.16
4366.94
3.37
14.97
70.42
37.28
0.005
0.014
0.230
0.039
0.196
0.001
0.039
0.190
0.005
0.103
1.48
4185.52
3.48
15.75
23.21
9.23
0.070
0.116
0.421
0.194
0.397
0.023
0.193
0.392
0.074
0.304
-36.47
438.61
0.00
0.00
11.04
6.30
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
(1.00
32.09
23408.34
10.00
82.00
99.80
52.72
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
Note: Based on Models I, 3, and 4 samples.
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TABLE Al. Jackknife permutation test (groupwise exclusion) based on Mode! 3
Baselinf. (no exclusions)
COW code 0-99 excluded
COW code 100-199 f.xctuded
COW code 200-325 excluded
COW cade 339-373 excluded
COW code 400-499 excluded
COW code 500-599 excluded
COW code 600-699 e.xcluded
COW code 700-850 excluded
COW code >850 excluded
Excluded group
"•' •""nl'-ie^
None
North and Middle America
South America
Weil and Central Europe
East und Souih-East Europe
Central Africa
Southern Africa
Northern Africa
Asia
Australia & Oceania
95% confidence intervals .
Interstiiti-
-0.74.
-0.49.
-0.70.
-0.74.
-0.60.
-1.25.
-0 .71 .
-1.28.
-0.57.
-0 .73.
flirt
. 0.06
. 0.23
. 0.17
. 0.08
. 0.20
.-0.37
. 0.74
.-0.43
. 0.99
. 0.08
Civil
-0 .29. .
-0 .28 . .
-0 .33 . .
-0 .25 . .
-0 .15 . .
-0 .67. .
-0 .24. .
-0 .55 , .
-0 .28 . .
-0 .29. ,
war
0.19
0.27
0.23
0.23
0.32
-0 .16
0.19
-0.27
0.28
0.19
Etlmifiil
civil war
-0.54.
-0.55.
-0.75.
-0.87.
-0.77.
-0.86.
-0 .23 .
-0 .71 .
-0 .81 .
-0.57.
.-0.28
.-0.29
.-0.41
.-0.53
.-0.43
.-0.51
. 0.02
.-0.41
.-0.45
.-0.30
Noie: COW ccide refers lo couiilr)' code frcim [he Currelates <il' W;ir pn
TABLE A2. Results from bootstrap modeling
Variable
Standard
Replications Ohscrvtd Bias error
95% confidence
interval
Model I
INTERSTATE CONFLICT llMH) - 0 . 3 8 3 - 0 . 0 0 4 U,I73
civi l . WAR 1000 - 0 . 3 4 7 - 0 . 0 0 1 0.080
a723
0.676
0.505
0.507
-0.044
-0.002
-0.189
-0.191
N
BC
N
BC
Model .<
INTERNATIONAL WAK I (MHl
NONETHNir CIVIL WAR 1000
ETHNIC OVIL WAR KXH)
0..13V
0.049
0.412
0,0fl7
0.001
0.002
(1,1 M5
0,178
0.093
- 0.7(12
- 0 . 6 7 1
- 0 . 3 9 8
-0,350
-0.595
-0.611
(1,025
0.048
0.300
0.369
-0.230
-0.238
N
BC
N
BC
N
BC
Note: N - normul, BC = bias correcied.
Appendix 2. Robustness Tests
We did two robustness tests—groupwise jackknife and bootstrap—to study whether the
results reported in Model 3 ot Table 2 stand up against the apparent variance across con-
flicts. See Table AI. A groupwise jackknife excludes each group of observation once. In the
jackknife, we tested the robustness of our model in respect to such influence by eliminating
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groups of neighboring countries from the estimation. We distinguish between nine country
groups: North and Middle America, South America, West and Central Europe, East and
South-East Europe, Central Africa, Southern Africa, Northern Africa, Asia, as well as Aus-
tralia and Ozeania. We found that for civil wars and especially for ethnic civil wars the
estimates presented in Table 2 are fairly robust to the exclusion of geographical regions.
The effect of interstate wars on the relative gender gap, however, shows strong regional
variations, suggesting that not all international wars are alike in their influence on the civil
population. The only statistically signilicant deviation for ethnic civil wars is southern Africa,
where such conflicts affect women more strongly still than the average conflict in the global
sample as the confidence interval ties entirely above the one from the global sample.
We observe similar robustness when bootstrapping Models 1 and 3. See Table A2. We
used various procedures, each with I,(X)O replications. We observed that the estimated bias
for all variables including the conflict variables is negligibly low (we show only the boot-
strapped results of the conflict variables here). The confidence intervals of both the normal
regression and the bias corrected results almost perfectly overlap. Thus we may conclude
thai our results are not sensitive to particular cases.
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